Markets are awaiting details of new measures promised by the Bank of England to ease banks’ difficulties obtaining longer-term funding, particularly to finance mortgage lending. What form could they take?
In principle, the Bank can offer relief in three main ways:
Under 1, the Bank has already moved a long way. Longer-term lending (i.e. for three months or longer, including the loan to Northern Rock) now accounts for an estimated 80% of funds advanced to the banking system, up from 30% in September last year. A further increase is possible but is unlikely to have a significant beneficial impact.
Under 2, the Bank has allowed some widening but continues to operate stricter rules than the Fed and ECB. It still requires government collateral for its normal weekly operations and a portion of its longer-term lending. Banks have been allowed to use AAA-rated asset-backed securities in special auctions of three-month funds in December and January, which have been rolled over and expanded in March and April. Last September, the Bank offered to auction three-month funds against a broad range of collateral including mortgages and corporate bonds as well as ABS but imposed a high minimum bid rate, resulting in no take-up. Applying this broad collateral definition to all longer-term lending, without enforcing a penal rate, would be helpful in both widening access to official funds and allowing liquidity-short banks to borrow in greater amounts.
A significant improvement in funding conditions is, however, also likely to require measure 3 – an increase in aggregate lending to the banking system. This presents a technical issue: any such expansion requires offsetting sterilisation measures to prevent banks’ reserve balances with the Bank rising above target. (An overshoot of reserve balances would result in very short-term interest rates falling below Bank rate, undermining MPC policy.) Two possible measures for achieving a rise in lending without boosting banks’ reserves are as follows. First, the Bank could ask the Debt Management Office to repay immediately the government’s remaining “ways and means” borrowing from the Bank, releasing funds for market operations. Secondly, the DMO could issue an additional quantity of Treasury bills or gilts relative to its current plans, placing the proceeds on deposit at the Bank for onward lending to the banks.
The tables below illustrate how the Bank of England’s balance sheet and the size and composition of its lending to the banking system might change if these proposals were implemented. Specifically, the following assumptions are made:
Changes c and d would allow an increase in the Bank’s aggregate lending to the banking system from its current level of £65 billion to £93 billion. Within this total, changes a and b would permit new longer-term lending of £38 billion against mortgage collateral. This is a significant sum in the context of the overall mortgage market – sufficient to finance five months worth of net lending at its recent pace.
In addition to these measures, the authorities should also consider emulating the Federal Reserve’s “term securities lending facility”, under which banks are able to swap mortgage-backed securities for Treasuries held on the Fed’s balance sheet, with the Treasuries then used as collateral to obtain funds in the market. The Bank of England holds few gilts on its balance sheet so such a facility would require the DMO to create extra gilts specifically for this purpose.